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Γιώργος Κατρούγκαλος, Πανεπιστήμιο Θράκης
Γαβριέλλα Λαζαρίδου, Πανεπιστήμιο του Leicester
ABSTRACT
The present paper examines the identity of 
the “South European” deviation against 
classical typologies. Against this back-
ground, the argument presented some years 
earlier by Katrougalos and Lazaridis (2003) 
is revisited, bearing in mind later contri-
butions in the field as well as recent data. 
The article then proceeds by presenting the 
main traits of Southern European states, ar-
guing that they all share the basic charac-
teristics of the “state-corporatist” welfare 
model. Nonetheless, important differences 
can be discerned among them, while some 
seem to share more common features with 
France than with the other members of the 
Southern cluster. These differences are in 
turn attributed to their historic traditions, 
and in particular the dissimilar weight of 
patronage and clientelism. 
KEY WORDS: Welfare state, Southern Eu-
rope, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal
ΠΕΡIΛΗΨΗ
Το παρόν άρθρο εξετάζει τα ιδιαίτερα γνωρίσματα 
της «νοτιο-ευρωπαϊκής» απόκλισης υπό το πρίσμα 
των κλασικών κατηγοριοποιήσεων των κρατών πρό-
νοιας. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, επανεξετάζεται το επιχείρη-
μα των Katrougalos & Lazaridis (2003) λαμβάνοντας 
υπόψη μεταγενέστερες θέσεις και τα πρόσφατα 
δεδομένα. Ακολούθως παρουσιάζονται τα βασικά 
γνωρίσματα των κρατών της νότιας Ευρώπης. Υπο-
στηρίζεται ότι το σύνολο των κρατών αυτών χαρα-
κτηρίζεται από τα βασικά χαρακτηριστικά του «κρα-
τικού-κορπορατιστικού» προνοιακού μοντέλου. Την 
ίδια στιγμή εμφανής είναι η ύπαρξη σημαντικών 
διαφορών μεταξύ τους σε σημείο που κάποια από 
τα κράτη αυτά να εμφανίζουν περισσότερα κοινά 
χαρακτηριστικά με τη Γαλλία παρά με τα λοιπά μέλη 
του νοτιο-ευρωπαϊκού μοντέλου. Η ύπαρξη των δι-
αφορών αυτών ανάγεται στις διαφορετικές ιστορικές 
παραδόσεις και ειδικότερα στο διαφορετικό ειδικό 
βάρος των πελατειακών σχέσεων.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Κράτος πρόνοιας, Νότια Ευ-
ρώπη, Ιταλία, Ισπανία, Ελλάδα, Πορτογαλία 
1. The institutional identity of the 
South European welfare states
1.1 The argument for a “Southern European welfare state”
I t is not until recently (mid-1990s) that the academic debate started dealing in more detail with the study of the ‘South European welfare state’. A number of authors have suggested 
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the existence of a distinct Latin-Rim (Leibfried, 1993), Mediterranean (Bonoli, 1997) or semi-
peripheral welfare state (Santos, 1994; Hespanha, 1999, Marinakou, 1998), comprising Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. However the more influential argument about a Southern European 
Welfare State has been proposed by Ferrera. Initially, Ferrera (1993) has proposed a classification of 
welfare states based on the coverage of social protection schemes and the differentiation between 
universal and occupational coverage. He has suggested four types of classification, occupational 
pure, occupational mixed, universalistic pure and universalistic mixed models. There is a strong 
point in this line of thought, as it helps to identify winners and losers in different welfare systems, 
especially with regard to insiders and outsiders of the market (cf. also Bonolli, 1997). In this 
typology, Italy, the only Southern European country analytically examined, is classified together 
with Switzerland and Netherlands in the “mixed occupational model”.
However, in more recent works (Ferrera, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2005), he and others 
following his argumentation (Rhodes, 1997), have proposed a distinct Southern European model, 
with main characteristics:
A) A highly fragmented and “corporatist” income maintenance system, displaying an internal 
polarization: peaks of generosity for privileged strata of the population coexist with important 
gaps in protection. 
B) A low degree of state penetration of the welfare sphere and a highly collusive mix between 
public and non public actors and institutions1.
C)  The strong influence of the Catholic Church.
D)  The persistence of clientelism and the formation of elaborated “patronage machines” for the 
selective distribution of cash subsidies. (Ferrera 1996, p. 17ff, p. 20ff),
E)  A differentiation from the corporatist traditions in the field of health care and the establishment 
of National Health Services based on universalistic principles. 
F)  The lack of an efficient, rational, Weberian type administration and the weakness of civil 
society (Niero, 1996, p. 118; Ferrera, 1997, p. 149; Ferrera, 1997, p. 235).
G)  The prominence of parties as the main aggregators of social interests and the existence of a 
radical left, not allowing the formation of consensual policies.
Most of these points do reflect the situation in the European South, especially in Italy and 
Greece. Despite this fact and although this model generally avoids the oversimplifications of other 
similar propositions, there are several points that need to be raised. It is to these that we now turn 
our attention.
1.2 A critical approach of the South-European model as the fourth 
world of Welfare Capitalism
First: Using Esping-Andersen’s methodology regarding the scope, the financing, the degree of 
decommodification2, the underlying organizational features, stratification and the public–private 
mix etc. it is clear that there is not any fundamental, structural difference of South-European 
countries, from the standards of the Continental model (cf. Katrougalos, 1996, Esping- Andersen, 
1997: 180, Wildeboer Schut et al. 2001). However, the addition of a “Latin-Rim” model is not 
based on Esping-Andersen’s criteria, but on a different framework of sociopolitical data. Ferrera 
has introduced a new set of political and sociological parameters that differentiate the Southern 
European countries inside the state-corporatist model. Therefore his propositions do not actually 
imply the existence of a new model, but merely suggest the existence of a sub-variation within the 
structural matrix of the existing ones. 
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The question whether “South-European” welfare states form a subregime or a regime of 
their own is not Byzantine, but of major theoretical and practical importance. In the first case 
scenario, if they just constitute a deviating continental welfare state, their participation in the 
Europeanization process could result to their gradual assimilation with the former archetype. 
Quite different will be the outcome in the second case, if they represent a resilient, structurally 
different model. Consequently, the question is not whether there are any particularities of the 
South-European model in comparison with the continental state-corporatist archetype (of course 
there are), but whether these particularities, by reference to the above mentioned criteria and not 
exogenous others, could be seen as constituting a distinct model. 
 Second: There are a number of substantial reservations concerning the fundamentals of the 
proposed model. To begin with, some of the proposed features (clearly among them: corporatist 
fragmentation; the public deficit in Welfare provision; and the influence of the Catholic Church) 
are shared by the other continental states. Some however, are not common to all four Southern 
countries, at least to the same extent (for example, the tradition of clientelism and patronage). 
It is true that some of the features common with the other countries of the continental model 
are found to a superlative degree in the European South. For instance, one sees the hyper-
fragmentation of insurance funds in Italy and Greece and the resulting huge inequalities. Still, the 
degree of corporatism is, by the explicit definition of Esping-Andersen, determined by the number 
of major occupationally distinct pension schemes. Not only Italy and Greece, but also France are 
characterized by a strong degree of occupational fragmentation as well as by a dualistic system of 
social protection. Portugal, on the other hand, offers a clear example of a relatively low degree of 
fragmentation (Ferrera, 1996, p. 19).
The same is true with regard to the treatment of the “selective generosity” of the pensions 
for the privileged strata of the population, usually the public functionaries. Naturally, by definition, 
the civil service pensions are occupational in nature. According to Esping-Andersen, the special 
treatment of civil servants “reflects the legacy of etatism and corporate privilege” throughout 
the whole conservative model (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 81) and the degree of “etatism” of a 
social protection system is measured by the expenditure on government employee pensions as a 
percentage of GDP (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 73). 
 Third: The “iper garantismo” (‘super generosity’), at least in favor of the insiders in the labor 
market, is one of Ferrara’s central arguments in support of the distinct character of the Southern 
European model. The evidence, however, shows that this is only true for Italy, and partially for 
Spain. According to OECD figures (Kalisch and Aman, 1999), the replacement rate of income for 
Greece is estimated at 60 per cent for the basic pension and, after the recent reform of 2008, 20 
per cent for the auxiliary pension of pensionable earnings, after 35 years of insurance. Currently, in 
total, 79.57 per cent of income is insured, when calculated according to article 66 of the European 
Code of Social Security. Only very few employees, especially in the public sector, do receive a 100% 
or more of their pensionable earnings, through a combination of primary and auxiliary pensions. 
In Portugal, the retirement pension ranges from 30 percent (minimum) to 80 per cent 
(maximum) of average earnings. A non-contributory supplement is added when the calculated 
benefit is less than the minimum rate set by law. According to OECD data, on average, newly-
retired workers in 1994 received benefits equal to 50.8 per cent of median wages (Roseveare et al., 
1996, p. 61). In Spain, as a result of the reforms of the last decade, the ratio of the initial pension 
in the General Regime and the average net wage in industry and services fell from 65 per cent in 
1984 to 53-6 per cent in the 1985-1990 period. (Gonzàlez-Pàramo, 1998). 
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Moreover, the aforementioned percentages refer to replacement rates, not to the final income 
of the retired population. The real situation of the level of pensions, far from being generous, can 
be determined only with reference to the calculation of pension benefits in “purchasing power 
standards: (PPS). The official statistics of the European Union (Eurostat, 1994) distinguish three 
groups of countries based on the criterion of the «generosity» of their social protection systems, 
calculated on the basis of average benefits paid to retired persons. Italy and Luxembourg belong 
in the most generous group. All the other Southern European countries, however, belong to the 
least generous group, together with Ireland. The Italian pensioner receives 135 per cent of the 
average benefit of the EU, and his/her Greek counterpart gets only half and the Portuguese a third 
of this amount. 
The internal differentiation of the four countries is also reflected in the ratio of the income of 
people aged 65+ to the income of people aged 0-64, which at the turn of the new millennium was 
0,96% for Italy, 0,91% for Spain but only 0,74% for Portugal and 0,76% for Greece, compared to 
0,88 of the EU average (Commission, 2002).
The final proof against the argument of “iper garantismo” is given by the ECHP data of the 
late 1990s showing that at least in Portugal and Greece, contrary to the other EU member states, 
old age is the most important factor in determining risk of poverty: The rate of risk of poverty for 
people over 65 in Greece is 25%, compared to 12% for the active population and 22% and 12%, 
respectively, for Portugal. In the EU-15 average, by contrast, the risk of poverty for people over 
65 is only slightly greater than this of the younger generation (12% and 11%, respectively). The 
situation is much better for the Italian and Spanish elderly, for whom the risk of poverty is only 8% 
and 7%, respectively, compared to 13% and 14% for the active population (Commission, 2002). 
 Fourth: The influence of the Catholic Church cannot be a distinctive feature of the model, not 
only because Greece is not a Catholic country and the Greek Orthodox Church does not play a similar 
role in the field of social policy, but principally as Catholicism marks also the core countries of the 
Continental model. It is true that the Iberian social protection systems, under the additive influence 
of absolutism and corporatism have typically been shaped by the Catholic Church’s fundamental 
encyclical principle of subsidiarity (Subsidiarium Officium Morena and Sarasa, 1991). Equally 
important is the emphasis on a Catholic version of corporatism that impregnates many Catholic 
Encyclicals (cf. especially the “Quadregissimo Anno” of Pius XII, 1931) and has exerted a major 
influence on the authoritarian and fascist regimes of the Iberian Peninsula. The integration of the 
corporations inside the State had also been the dominant form of the administrative and economic 
organization in fascist Italy; still, the absence of long authoritarian rule resulted in a different 
sociopolitical mixture, where clientelism was a much more important factor than corporatism.
 Fifth: The establishment of national health systems with universalistic aspirations has been 
proposed as a decisive factor of differentiation, resulting in “an original mix of corporatism and 
universalism” (Ferrera, 1997, p. 29). The assumption of universalism as a distinct characteristic of the 
model based on this sole element, however, seems exaggerated. First of all it is a relatively recent 
feature. It was not until the late 1970s that Italy adopted a universalistic approach in this area and 
the other three Southern European countries followed during the next decade. Moreover, universality 
still remains a half institutionalized premise. For instance, in Greece, 30 social health insurance 
organizations provide coverage to around 95 per cent of the population (Davaki and Mossialos, 
2006); the Portuguese National Health Service covers approximately 75 per cent of the population, 
the remaining 25 per cent, especially those in the civil service and the military, participate in special 
additional occupational schemes (Gouveia Pinto, 1997, p. 142). Even in Spain, where coverage 
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reaches 98.5 per cent of the population, of which 93 per cent are covered by the “compulsory” 
insurance scheme, 1 per cent obtain means-tested subsidies from the state and 4.5 per cent of the 
population, mostly civil servants, are insured through special schemes. (Jakubowski, 1998). 
Morever, the Southern NHS are not completely emancipated from occupational social 
insurance, which, especially in Greece funds about 40 per cent of total expenses. The same was 
true ofr Italy till the late 1990’s. Even in Portugal, where the funding of the NHS by taxation 
has been established since 1976, some services are still provided within the framework of social 
insurance. (Kyriopoulos and Niakas, 1993; Economou, 1999).
 Sixth: Clientelism has been suggested as a permanent feature of the political system and the 
system of social protection. This factor is clearly predominant in Greece and in Italy (Tsoukalas, 
1986; Mouzelis, 1977; Filias, 1981; Petmesidou, 1996; Fargion 1999)3 but much less so in the 
Iberian countries, which have a different, more corporatist tradition. It seems that in Spain and 
Portugal clientelistic policies are embedded only in some geographical areas and special sectors 
(e.g., invalidity pensions). For this reason, ‘clientelism should not be considered as a universal 
cultural characteristic of Southern Europe’ (Garcia, 1999, p. 158).
However, in both Italy and Greece, the expansion of a highly fragmented pension system 
has been used generally for distributing differentiated entitlements to selected party clienteles. 
The proliferation of invalidity pensions in Italy is an example of these policies on an individual 
basis. Another example is offered by the fact that in Greece about 40 per cent of private sector 
workers were classified as working under “arduous and unhealthy employment conditions”, which 
implies the right to early retirement. On the contrary, the extended authoritarian rule in Spain and 
Portugal resulted in a different pattern of a state dominated system, characterized by the exclusion 
of organized interests and a more uniform “state charity” pattern of welfare (see Santos, 1994; 
Guibentif, 1997; Rhodes, 1997, p. 9).
 Seventh: The most important objection one could have vis-à-vis Ferrera’s model is its “Italian 
bias”, that is a projection of the characteristics of the Italian system to the other three countries. 
As we have seen this is clear, for instance, with respect to the central argument about the “iper 
garantismo”, the purported “super generosity” of the pensions systems as an essential peculiarity 
of the “Southern Welfare System”.
First of all, one should take into account the fact that in Greece, Spain and Portugal, the 
wages are substantially lower than the European average and often very close to the poverty 
threshold. Therefore, it is understandable that lower replacement ratios would not ensure the 
survival of the recipients. Actually, the real situation of the level of pensions is far from being 
“generous”, for all countries except Italy. Admittedly, there is an important inequality between 
various categories of pensioners in the South, especially in Greece and Italy. More specifically, 
public servants maintain important advantages with regard to the contributions period and the 
replacement rate in comparison with the blue-collar workers of the private sector. Still, similar 
gaps between “high” and “low” protection constitute a general characteristic of the continental 
model. (cf. also Schulte, 1999, p. 212). 
1.3 The South-European “variant” as a sub-category of the State-
corporatist model
One cannot but agree with Ferrera that the ‘“conservative-corporatist” political scenario of 
continental Europe (is) much more complicated in the South, significantly altering the strategies 
of the various actors’ (Ferrera, 1997, p. 30). The “Southerners” do represent a distinct group 
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within the family of the Continental welfare states, a variant of this model. ‘The peculiarities of 
these cases are variations within a distinct overall logic, not a wholly different logic per se’ (Esping- 
Andersen, 1999: 90, cf. Moreno, 2006).
They are merely underdeveloped species of the Continental model, welfare states “in their 
infancy”, with their main common characteristics the immaturity and relative inefficiency of the 
social protection systems (Gough, 1996, p. 13, who also includes Turkey in his “rudimentary 
assistance regime”) and some comparable social and family structures. Not only are their founding 
principles undeniably Bismarkean, but also their current institutional, organizational and economic 
features bear the “signature” of the continental-state corporatist model. Our argument is that the 
undeniable deviations are either the result of the delayed development of the social protection 
systems and/or the outcome of the aforementioned distortions of the administrative and political 
system. It is noteworthy that even the authors who support the institutional distinctiveness of these 
countries, after a while do not refer to it as a model but rather as the outcome of a chronic disease, 
speaking about the “southern institutional syndrome” (Rhodes, 1997, p. 15). As Matsaganis writes 
(1999, p. 22), ‘in the social protection systems of Southern Europe there are all the distortions of 
the “conservative model” but to a higher degree’. 
However, as there is some clear evidence of convergence with the other European state-
corporatist states (cf. Karamessini, 2008), we will continue to consider the Southern member states 
of the EU as a group of countries with many social, political and administrative affinities. That is 
we will treat them not as a fourth model in the Esping-Andersen classification, but rather as the 
“discount edition” of the continental one (Abrahamson, 1992, p. 10). Still, one should refrain from 
regarding all Southern EU member states as similar; the differences are rather important, especially 
between Italy and Greece, countries of unequal socioeconomic development and between Italy 
and Greece on the one hand and the Iberian countries on the other. 
2. Basic characteristics of the welfare state in Southern Europe
2.1 Social protection systems
P resently, all of their Constitutions establish the normative principle of the “Social State” either explicitly4 or by means of constitutional provisions guaranteeing a number of social rights5. At 
a sub-constitutional level, the legal entitlement to services or, more often, to monetary transfers in 
cash, is guaranteed by an analytical and meticulous aggregate of public law regulations. As already 
mentioned, the welfare provisions are largely based on the insurance principle, connecting social 
benefits to contributions and consequently, to the salary of the workers. Inevitably, social rights 
are not universal, but categorical and work focused.
This institutional commitment sharply contrasts to one of the most striking characteristics 
of the social protection system in the Southern European countries, that is, the delay in the 
development of the Welfare State. This is strictly associated with the overall delay of economic 
development, as there is a clear correlation between insufficient social expenditure and low GDP 
(Eurostat, 1994b; Commission Européenne; 1998, p. 7). All of them (with the exception of the 
Italian North and some regions in Spain) have been, till very recently, rather poor agricultural 
countries, characterized by late and incomplete industrialization. The gap between them and the 
“core” European countries has not been overcome yet. For instance, in the 1990s, the GDP per 
head in Greece and in Portugal still amounted to only 65 per cent of the Union average (Eurostat, 
1994b). The corollary of the belated economic development was the institutional delay of welfare 
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state formation. For example, a compulsory insurance scheme against unemployment was not 
introduced in Portugal until 1975 (Hoffmann, 1983). 
The democratization of Greece, Spain and Portugal, the least developed countries of the 
region, in the 1970’s, was concomitant with an effort to build the structures of a genuine welfare 
state. The rise of the socialist parties in power favored the process. Over the 1980-1992 period, the 
southern states have had a real growth of social protection expenditure per capita of approximately 
70 per cent, whereas the corresponding figure for the six highest spending Member States was 
only 31.7 per cent and the EU average 40.6 per cent (Eurostat, 1994b). In the following period 
only Greece kept up the same rhythm. So, over the period 2000-2004 per-capita social protection 
expenditure at constant prices has increased in EU-25 by an average of 2.2% per annum and in 
Greece by 5.2% (Eurostat, 2007).
However, in 2004 the gross average social protection expenditure in the Southern European 
countries was still lower than the EU average of 27.3% of GDP, but not considerably: the respective 
figures are 26,1% for Italy, 26% for Greece, 24,9% for Portugal and 20 % for Spain (Eurostat, 
2007). All countries belong to the group of middle spenders regarding the percentage of social 
expenses to GDP and low spenders with regard to social expenditure expressed in PPS (see tables 
1-2). Still, it is noteworthy that the expansion of the welfare structures, unlike the experience of 
other European countries, occurred in a period of general economic recession. 
Table 1: Expenditure on social protection as PPS per capita in EU, Southern  
     European Countries and core Continental Countries 2004
EU-
25
EU-
15
ΡΤ EL ES ΙΤ FR ΒΕ NL ΑΤ LU DE
6188 7252 4082 4830 4438 6257 7772 7890 8056 8062 12180 7239
Source: ESSPROS Data 1996-2004, Eurostat 2007
Table 2: Expenditure on social protection as % of GDP in EU, Southern  
     European Countries and core Continental Countries, 2000-2004
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004
EU-
25 
26.6 
26.8 
27.0 
27.4 
27.3
EU-
15 
26.9 
27.1 
27.4 
27.7 
27.6 
PT 
21.7 
22.7 
23.7 
24.2 
24.9
EL
 25.7 
26.7 
26.2 
26.0 
26.0
ES
 19.7 
19.5 
19.8 
19.9 
20.0
IT 
24.7 
24.9 
25.3 
25.8 
26.1
FR 
29.5 
29.6 
30.4 
30.9 
31.2
BE
26.5
27.3
28.0
29.1
29.3
NL 
26.4 
26.5 
27.6 
28.3 
28.5
AT 
28.2 
28.6 
29.1 
29.5 
29.1
LU
19.6
20.8
21.4
22.2
22.6
DE 
29.2 
29.3 
29.9 
30.2 
29.5
Source: ESSPROS Data 1996 – 2004, Eurostat 2007
In Italy and Greece (but not in Spain and Portugal) the bulk of income transfers is absorbed 
by old age pensions and to a lesser degree, invalidity pensions. (see table 3) These are in 
principle, calculated on the basis of the previous salary and the contributions paid. The rates 
of these contributions differ widely across occupational categories and economic sectors, with 
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private employees generally paying the highest rates. However, due to the fragmentation of the 
social insurance units and the plethora of related schemes, especially in Greece and Italy, there 
is a considerable divergence of the benefits paid to different categories of the retired population 
(Venieris, 1994). The amount of benefits that households receive in the domain of family allowances 
or child care is below the EU average. If we take family benefits as an example, these are below the 
EU-25 average of 7,8 per cent; spending of family benefits in Greece (6.9 per cent) is lower that 
that of the EU-15 average but is still ahead of Spain (3.5 per cent), Portugal (5.3 per cent) and Italy 
(4.4 per cent) (Taylor-Gooby 2006: 406, Eurostat, 2007). 
Table 3: Social benefi ts as % of total social benefi ts (TSB) and as % 
of GDP in EU, Southern European Countries and core Continental Countries
Old-age and
survivors
Sickness/
health care
Disability Family/children Unemployment
Housing and 
social
exclusion
% of 
TSB
% of 
GDP
% of 
TSB
% of 
GDP
% of 
TSB
% of 
GDP
% of 
TSB
% of 
GDP
% of 
TSB
% of 
GDP
% of 
TSB
% of 
GDP
EU-25 45.9 12.0 28.3 7.4 8.1 2.1 7.8 2.1 6.5 1.7 3.4 0.9
EU-15 45.7 12.2 28.3 7.5 8.0 2.1 7.8 2.1 6.6 1.8 3.5 0.9
PT 47.2 11.0 30.4 7.1 10.4 2.4 5.3 1.2 5.7 1.3 1.0 0.2
EL 50.9 12.8 26.5 6.7 5.0 1.3 6.9 1.7 5.9 1.5 4.7 1.2
ES 43.7 8.5 30.8 6.0 7.5 1.5 3.5 0.7 12.9 2.5 1.7 0.3
IT 61.3 15.4 25.9 6.5 6.1 1.5 4.4 1.1 2.0 0.5 0.3 0.1
FR 43.6 12.8 30.0 8.8 5.8 1.7 8.5 2.5 7.8 2.3 4.4 1.3
BE 44.1 12.3 27.7 7.7 6.8 1.9 7.1 2.0 12.5 3.5 1.8 0.5
NL 41.6 11.1 30.4 8.1 10.9 2.9 4.8 1.3 6.3 1.7 6.0 1.6
AT 48.2 13.6 25.0 7.1 8.3 2.3 10.7 3.0 6.0 1.7 1.8 0.5
LU 36.5 8.1 25.0 5.5 13.5 3.0 17.4 3.8 4.7 1.0 2.9 0.6
DE 43.5 12.4 27.2 7.7 7.7 2.2 10.5 3.0 8.6 2.4 2.5 0.7
Source: ESSPROS Data 1996-2004, Eurostat 2007
The disproportionate distribution of the social benefits between the elderly and the non-
aged population is a salient characteristic of the state-corporatist model. Whereas the welfare 
State covers about 50 per cent of the day care needs of Swedish or Danish children, the coverage 
is below and below 4 per cent in Greece and Spain (Bagavos, 2003). The basic reason for this 
underdevelopment of child care is that it remains by and large the family’s responsibility, with the 
possible exception of Portugal, in which an unusually high percentage of female employment6 has 
forced the state to undertake part of it. These services are traditionally provided by women (full-
time housewives). 
 A factor of differentiation, which partly explains the dissimilar pattern of welfare benefit 
distribution in the Iberian countries, especially in Spain, is, since the beginning of the 1980’s, the 
departure of their social protection systems from the traditional orientation of income protection 
towards a system focusing more on economic growth and employment support (Rhodes, 1997, p. 
38). The new paradigm has workfare characteristics and is targeting the excluded through means 
tests (Lapara and Aguilar, 1997).
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Another common characteristic in most southern European countries, subsequent to the 
predominance of insurance based benefits, is the very low expenditure on social assistance. This 
is particularly low in Greece and relatively higher in Italy and in Spain. In the latter country, 
in the 90’s social assistance schemes covered 12 per cent of the population, as a response to 
high unemployment and job instability, which constituted a very important danger for the social 
cohesion of Spain (Lapara and Aguilar, 1997). Nevertheless, the new social assistance programs 
are rather extensions of the contributory ones, failing to reach the real outsiders of the market and 
those excluded from the market, thus reconfirming, the “corporatist” character of the system.
In addition, and contrary to the median Continental “core” countries, until recently the 
southern welfare systems lacked any kind of universal minimum income support scheme (and 
they are still lacking income maintenance for non insured young persons below 25 and first-job 
seekers). Portugal was the first to introduce such a scheme (in 1996), while local and regional 
schemes exist in Italy and Spain. In Greece there is still no such scheme. 
Regarding the financing of the social security system, there is an absolute dominance of 
contribution based social insurance schemes. Although the idea of an equal distribution of the 
expenses between the State, the employers and the employees has been discussed recently within 
the framework of a social dialogue prior to the adoption of the reforms of the insurance legislation 
in all four countries, the advent of the new millennium found traditional institutional patterns 
remaining almost intact. Only the National Health Systems are financed by the state. Yet, in 
practice, the public purse also covers the deficits of the insurance units. Accordingly, the pattern 
of financing is similar to the average of the state-corporatist model. (see table 4).
Table 4: Social protection receipts as % of total receipts in EU, 
Southern European Countries and core Continental Countries, 2000-2004
Tax financed 
and general 
government
contributions
Social contributions
Other receipts   Total Employers Protectedpersons 
2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004
EU-25 35.4 37.3 60.9 59.5 38.7 38.6 22.3 20.9 3.7 3.2
EU-15 35.5 37.5 61.0 59.5 38.7 38.6 22.2 20.8 3.6 3.1
PT 39.1 42.2 53.0 47.5 35.6 31.7 17.4 15.7 7.9 10.4
EL 29.2 30.5 60.8 60.8 38.2 37.3 22.6 23.5 10.0 8.7
ES 27.4 30.3 68.7 67.2 52.4 50.9 16.3 16.4 3.9 2.4
IT 40.6 42.4 57.7 56.0 42.8 41.2 14.9 14.8 1.6 1.6
FR 30.4 30.4 65.9 66.0 46.0 45.5 19.9 20.6 3.8 3.5
BE 25.3 27.0 72.1 71.1 49.9 49.3 22.3 21.8 2.5 1.9
NL 14.4 19.2 67.5 68.7 29.4 34.0 38.1 34.7 18.1 12.1
AT 32.7 34.6 66.0 64.0 39.0 37.2 27.0 26.8 1.3 1.4
LU 46.9 44.6 48.6 51.8 24.7 27.3 23.8 24.5 4.6 3.6
DE 31.8 34.5 66.1 63.8 38.5 36.3 27.6 27.6 2.1 1.7
Source: ESSPROS Data 1996 – 2004, Eurostat 2007
In the EU, 59,3% of the financing of social protection still comes from contributions, some 
60% of this paid by employers. In the Southern European countries there is a similar situation, 
as most revenue comes from contributions. The proportion derived from social contributions is 
greater in Spain, accounting for 67,2% of total receipts, which is similar to the core countries of 
the corporate model (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany) It is only in Portugal that this 
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type of financing is slightly less than 50% (47,5%) (Eurostat, 2007, for the similar, older data see 
Commission Européenne, 1998, p. 10; Eurostat, 2000).
2.2 Familism
Statism, familism and soft-budgeting are three pillars which compensate for and to a certain 
extent legitimise the lack of inter alia effective labour market policies. It is within this environment 
that the passive and active labour market policies outlined in Katrougalos and Lazaridis (2003), 
take place. 
Familism is a key component of the clientelistic forms of social organisation, which in turn 
are closely related to the practice of appropriating resources by political means. Soft-budgeting 
refers to ‘an accounting practice by individuals, families and household and enterprises in which 
the strict condition that earnings must always be greater than, or at least equal to expenses, is not 
obeyed, simply because someone else is paying the difference (Petmesidou and Tsoulouvis, 1994: 
22). Imbalances like this are met via clientelistic means. 
The family in Southern Europe is a strong institution. It is defined as a social unit founded 
on heterosexual marriage. Discriminating effects result from the privileged treatment of this 
special kind of living arrangement (eg: with the exception of Spain and Portugal, constitutional 
rights are offered only to heterosexual married couples) which in turn determines eligibility for 
tax relief and social security entitlements. In Greece different forms of interpersonal relationships 
and personal living arrangements, such as same sex partnerships and other forms of relationships 
outside the traditional form of marriage, are either not supported by social policies or not equally 
protected and discriminated against by the social security systems of the southern European 
member states. Unlike Greece, in Italy since the late 1980s cohabiting couples could officially 
register their partnership (Hantrais, 1995: 88-89); Portugal has since the mid-nineties introduced 
laws on the protection of cohabitating couples. Idealising the traditional family arrangements 
means reproducing personal relationships of power and dependence among family members; in 
earnings related benefit provision, ‘the husband is employed (full time) and acquires social security 
entitlements for himself and his dependants, whereas the wife is the family worker and receives 
social protection only indirectly through her husband’ Leitner (2001: 103). 
What does this two-tier system mean for women? If we take retirement benefits as an 
example, the benefits granted to those elderly who do not have matured contributive entitlements, 
which is the case with women who may have had a history of discontinuous employment or are in 
part-time employment due to the need to look after a dependant family member, is much lower 
than the benefit received at the age of retirement by someone who has had a full career formal 
economy (Ferrera, 1996: 20). This disruption of career is often encouraged by limiting the supply 
of public social services to a minimum. A minimum duration of insurance coverage is required to 
acquire eligibility to earnings-related pension; whereas in Italy this minimum qualifying period is 
as low as 5 years of contributions, Greece, Portugal and Spain require 15 years of coverage (Leitner, 
2001: 103). Those working discontinuously, which are most likely to be women, do not meet the 
qualifying conditions and are thus restricted from access to pension schemes. Regarding women 
who decide to retire earlier in order to look after a grandchild, or an elderly infirm spouse, the final 
benefit received is affected as the final benefit calculation is affected by the period of insurance 
coverage – the maximum period of insurance coverage is 35 years in Greece and Spain, 40 years in 
Portugal, whereas in Italy there is no limit to it. 
issue5.indd   14 20/10/08   22:32:23
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:12:29 |
SOCIAL COHESION AND DEVELOPMENT [15]
Women’s economic dependence on the family is not seen as a social problem (Saraceno, 
1994). In Southern Europe, the notion of ‘subsidiarity’ means family first, state last resort. The 
state intervenes when family resources are exhausted and has not the ‘socialising’ approach one 
would find in, for example, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) social democratic regime. It also requires 
a specific organisation of work within the household where one adult member functions as the 
family breadwinner while the other cares for the family. This is crucial in understanding gender 
relations in the European south, despite the latest changes stemming from the rise of female 
employment, especially in Portugal. 
The price of allowing women to enter the labour market is by en large falling either onto the 
family budget, (eg: hiring informal paid work), or onto family and kinship support networks. 
The majority of offspring tend to live with their parents until they get married, with the 
exception of those who migrate for studies or for work (Lazaridis and Koumandraki, 2001; Bernardi, 
2005; Holdsworth, 2005). During this time, they are financially supported by the family irrespective 
of whether they have a separate income or not. Family obligations are defined and re-defined 
during various stages of the life cycle. ‘For every young working woman there is at least one older 
woman (mother or mother-in-law) who may not live in the same household but who plays an 
active part in taking care of children’ (Ruspini, 2000: 108). When the children become adults and 
parents older, the caring roles change in that the younger generation is now responsible for the 
care of the elderly. The family unit is operating as a ‘social clearing house mediating the difficult 
relationships between a variegated labour market and equally variegated income maintenance 
systems’ (Ferrera, 1996: 21). 
Earnings-related schemes often grant additional credits for unpaid care work, such as care 
of children, thus partially compensating for time spent undertaking caring work. The length of 
periods credited varies from one country to another; for example, up to six months of coverage 
per child in Greece and Italy (in both cases available only to mothers), two years in Portugal, 
one year in Spain (with two optional additional years without entitlements for pensions and 
unemployment). Italy has also a subsidized pension scheme for housewives. Also, there are old 
age benefits available for spouses and survivors of persons who are covered by an earnings-related 
scheme; in Greece for example, the spouse receives a flat rate supplement for a dependent spouse, 
whereas a survivor receives 70% of the deceased’s pension. In Italy and Portugal the survivor 
receives 60% of the deceased’s pension respectively (in Italy this is income tested), and 45% in 
Spain. However, such benefits are low when compared to entitlements gained from employment. 
Entitlement for family work ‘does not result from direct but indirect social rights’ (Leitner, 2001: 
108). Furthermore, such benefits reflect the norm of heterosexuality combined with the institution 
of marriage. The privileged treatment of traditional family arrangements based on the principle 
of subsidiarity on the one hand and entitlements for spouses alongside a limited supply of public 
social services, helps maintain the traditional division of labour where one person functions as the 
family breadwinner and the other as the family carer. 
Under-provision of services implies that a large amount of the care work to be done is done 
by women and assumes that there are women at home ready to do it, be it citizens (traditional full 
time housewives) or strangers (hired help). According to Liefbroer and Corijn (1999) ‘structural-
role incompatibility’ between the opportunities available to women in the labour market and the 
constraints that they face when trying to take advantage of these opportunities is often coupled 
with a ‘cultural incompatibility’ which relates to the ideologies, values and norms concerning their 
role in society. However, if one compares the data from the World Values Survey on women’s 
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attitudes towards family and gender roles for Portugal to that for the other three southern European 
countries under study, it seems that the Portuguese women tend to have a more ‘traditional’ view 
about the role of women in the family and society to that of the other three countries. 
The arrangements for paid maternity leave in the four countries differ. In Greece paid 
maternity leave is given for 16 weeks with 100% income replacement; but it pays the lowest 
maternity benefits of the four. Similar to Greece, in Spain this is given for 16 weeks on 75% 
income replacement, whereas this is more generous in Portugal (18 weeks on 100% replacement 
rate) and in Italy (22 weeks on 80% replacement rate). Greece, Spain and Portugal provide the 
right to paternity leave (2 days with 100% income replacement in Spain and 5 days in Portugal). 
Entitlement often depends on having a contract for permanent employment.  
Arrangements for parental leave vary: in Spain, Greece and Portugal there is no statutory 
entitlement to paid parental leave. People who interrupt their career to look after their children 
have to do so without pay. Italy offers six months, Spain 12-36 months, Portugal 6-24 months, 
while Greece offers the shortest period of parental leave in the private sector in the EU, 3.5 months 
(6 months for lone parents), and is offered only to those employed by companies with more than 50 
employees, thus excluding all those employed by small companies (Ruxton, 1996; Papadopoulos, 
1998). 
Non income related family benefits are not available in Italy and Spain whereas in Greece 
and Portugal are and depend on number and age of children. Portugal has the lowest age limit; 
benefits are paid for all children up to the age of fifteen and can be extended for another ten years 
for those who continue in education. In Greece, Italy and Spain benefits are paid for children up to 
the age of eighteen, but whereas in Greece the limit can be extended up to the age of twenty-two, 
Italy and Spain have no such provision (Hantrais, 1995: 90). 
The familistic nature of the Southern European welfare model explains the embryonic form of 
the regime as regards family policies. Despite the importance of the family in caring for children 
well into adulthood and in spite of the strong moral and ideological emphasis on the role of the 
family in holding society together, there is a lack of family policy (Gauthier, 1995). A pattern of 
power relationships among members of the family and the residual family policy reinforce the 
role of women as the main carers of children and the elderly. It also reinforces the reproduction 
of private patriarchal relationships, whilst a shift towards public patriarchal relationships still 
remains in an embryonic form. Women’s different experiences and structural position seem to 
militate against their full access to the rights of citizenship (Walby, 1997: 173). Social citizenship 
depends upon being a worker for full access to citizenship rights, as ‘significant aspects of income 
maintenance payments by the state, pensions, and related welfare provision are provided as a 
result of wage employment’ (ibid). Women who are not employed, fall back on meagre levels 
of support (eg: pension benefits), often derived via their spouses, so long as they stay married. 
Women who work part-time or have interrupted their employment for a period of time, in order 
to be able to meet their commitments to the care of children and/or elderly relatives, are often not 
able to get access to a decent pension, as this is incompatible with the role of carer. Walby (1997: 
173) asks: ‘should women only be entitled to citizenship if they behave like men and have lifetime 
commitment to paid employment’? ‘And if so, what are the implications for those who need 
care’? These are important questions as under the rules of the southern European welfare systems 
paid employment is the main route of access to decent support in old age. One solution would 
be for women to enter the labour market and demand that their position as carers is supported 
by coherent child care policies which would reflect the value of caring work to society whether it 
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be done in private or in public. However, if women are to be fully integrated into full democratic 
citizenship, radical changes in personal and domestic life are required. In southern Europe, 
although many changes have taken place gradually eroding the male breadwinner character of the 
welfare state in southern Europe, more changes need to take place; for example, although mothers 
with young children have increased their participation in the labour market (in the mid 1990s 52% 
of Italian mothers between 20 and 30 and 77% of Portuguese mothers in this age group were 
employed), the point of departure in terms of having a choice in terms of decommodification and 
defamilialisation in conjuncture with personal autonomy is yet to come. ‘A more desirable welfare 
state from the point of view of women as mothers would not merely aid them when their children 
are young but also ensure that lifetime benefits, such as pensions, are not sacrificed or indeed that 
these directly reflect the time spent raising children’ (Davaki, 2006: 265). 
2.3 Labor  market policies: recent developments up to the turn of 
the millennium
In an era of recession and high rates of unemployment throughout Europe, all Southern European 
countries have serious labor market problems, with high rates of unemployment, despite a move 
towards flexibilization (numerical and functional), decline of employment regulations in terms of 
restrictions on the freedom of firms to use particular work practices, new forms of less secure work 
contracts replacing old traditions of paternalistic and protective employment regulations. 
The employment rate is very similar in the three of the four countries. The percentage of male 
employment is 70.8 in Greece, 70.9 in Spain and 68.5 for Italy, whereas the respective figures for 
female employment are 40.9 in Greece, 41.9 in Spain and 41.1 in Italy. Portugal, on the contrary, 
scores higher both regarding the male (76.9%) and the female employment (61.1%), the latter 
being exceptionally high, almost at Scandinavian levels. (European Labor Force Survey, 2001). 
Nevertheless, in all four countries there is a relatively large gender gap in employment rates. (Low 
levels of women’s employment is a general feature of the continental-corporatist model (Gornick 
and Jacobs, 1998: 691) but the trend is more accented in the South).
Amongst the employed, in all four countries there is a division between the protected core 
and the rest, especially those in temporary and irregular employment, those in working in the 
informal sector and the unemployed. Amongst the unemployed, youth and women have been 
especially hard hit. In Greece for instance, the rates of unemployment of these groups were in the 
mid-1990s approximately 29 and 15 per cent respectively (OECD, 1996, p.p. 240-243). In 2001 
the respective figures for the young unemployed have improved only in Spain and Portugal (20% 
and 9.2% respectively), remaining very high for Greece 28% and Italy 27% (OECD, 2002, Statistical 
Annexes, Tables C).
In an attempt to tackle unemployment, all four countries embarked on a deregulation program 
in the 1990s. As a result there has been a proliferation of precarious fixed-term contracts, while 
the informal economy continues to grow. Having said that, part-time contracts are, in all four 
countries, significantly lower than the EU average and ranged from the mid-nineties till today from 
round 4.5% in Greece to 8.0% in Italy (Eurostat, 1995a, OECD, 2002, Table E). Actually, however, 
a large percentage of second or short-term jobs are located in the informal sector and do not 
appear in the statistics. The informal sector is therefore an important form of ‘unemployment and/
or subemployment relief’.  Estimates of the percentage of the population in each country working 
in the informal economy vary according to region and sector of economic activity. The informal 
economy produces an estimated 22% of the GDP in Portugal (Berneo, 2000, p. 270), between 
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30% and 45% of the GDP in Greece (Canellopoulos, 1995; Eurostat, 1995b) and constitutes 21% 
to 25% of Italy’s GDP (The Economist, 1997). The persistence and expansion of the informal 
economy activities, as an alternative process of income generation, has had profound implications 
on employment in these countries. Informalisation reinforces labour market segmentation, which 
in turn involves the compartmentalisation and isolation of different groups of participants in the 
labour market. More stable and secure jobs are offered in the primary that in the secondary labour 
market. Flexible use of family members, in response to seasonal labour shortages in the agricultural 
sector, goes back well prior to the tertiarisation process. These features, along with familism and 
clientelism, constitute elements of a complex and distinctive mode of income generation and 
distribution with important effects on the implementation of employment policies.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, all four countries had relatively restrictive employment 
protection legislation (for example, strict job demarcations and work schedules, strict rules for 
dismissals etc). This was considered to be one of the factors contributing to the rapidly growing 
unemployment rates mentioned above. At the same time, the informal sector allowed a degree of 
labour flexibility and deregulation7. This Janus face of the southern European labour market, partly 
allows for the relatively high levels of unemployment to be tolerated in an environment where 
unemployment insurance is a big burden on national budgets. 
Generally, there is no comprehensive strategy of labour market intervention but rather policies 
are fragmented into numerous legislative acts adopted ad hoc in response to particular problems. 
They comprise a large number of schemes that roughly correspond to different professional groups of 
the unemployed and different causes of unemployment (eg: collective versus individual dismissals). 
‘The fragmentation and disparities in income support system of the unemployed, with extreme 
differences and gaps in the level of social protection given to core and marginal workers, are the 
result of a complex system of guaranteeing full time, stable jobs for core workers (traditionally 
males in the middle age group) through employment protection measures, income support to 
laid-off workers and a public monopoly in job placement’ (Dell’Aringa and Lodovici, 1996, p. 
177). Under this system, those who cannot secure full employment and establish contributive 
entitlements in the formal labour market are offered little protection. Unemployment policies are 
often linked with policies developed as substitutes for unemployment insurance, such as invalidity 
pensions, typically in Italy, but also in Greece. 
Since the 1980s, labour market reforms have focused on ways to tackle unemployment and 
one of faces cheeks, labour market rigidity. In an attempt to improve labour market performance 
and combat unemployment, governments introduced various employment policy reforms, which, 
often, met serious resistance by the labour movement. Such reforms were more often than 
not introduced through public intervention and often aimed at fulfilling particularistic goals. 
Governments introduced market forces into many parts of the economy and deregulation measures 
for labour markets. This manifests a departure from a logic of reciprocity, of an immediate exchange 
of benefits between the state and the social partners.
One could again trace the differentiation of the southern European countries: initially the 
Iberian countries seemed both prone to follow neo-corporatist strategies, whereas Italy and 
Greece shared a common tradition of polarised labour relationships. More specifically, in Portugal, 
the mechanism of social concertation was officially introduced in 1984. Since then, wide social 
pacts have been consolidated in the context of a strategic frameworks for improving national 
economic competitiveness, such as the Economic and Social Agreement of 1990, which focused on 
improving the international competitiveness of Portuguese firms and on promoting the growth of 
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real wages. Another important step towards the reinforcement of social concertation is the ‘short 
term social pact’ signed in 1996, promoting, inter alia, a more flexible organisation of working 
time based on functional flexibility. 
Similarly in Spain in the early 1980s the government ‘conceded a substantial narrowing of 
wage differential and the maintenance of Francoist employment protection, in return for wage 
moderation and an ‘implicit pact’ between workers and economic managers under which the costs 
of economic modernisation would be accepted’ (Rhodes, 1997b, p. 114). Thus unions legitimised 
themselves as social actors, employers were rewarded and the state promoted modernisation of 
the economy. The Social and Economic Accord, for example, signed in the mid-1980s, sought 
to inject more flexibility into the labour market by reducing restriction on part-time work and 
seasonal employment, increasing options for temporary employment and lowering the minimum 
wage standards for workers under 18 (Encarnacion, 2000, p. 39-40). However, the persistence of 
government in achieving wage moderation by encouraging casualisation of employment could not 
be anymore supported by the trade unions. By the mid-1980s social concertation broke down and 
from then on reforms were introduced either unilaterally by the government or with consultation 
with employers’ associations. 
The reform of the late 1980s and 1990s lave legalised fixed-term contracts, lifted restrictions 
on part-time work and relaxed dismissal procedures, thus promoting employment vial deregulation 
of the labour market. 
On the contrary, Italy and Greece have had traditionally highly polarised industrial relations, 
which limited the possibility of broad social arrangements on policy reforms. It is true that the 
1990s seemed to represent a turning point for Italy, as consensual reforms aimed to reorganised 
‘the entire system of job placement, creating new space for private actors in the regulation of the 
labour market and promoting new active policies for local government’ (Ferrera and Gualmini, 
2000, p. 194). However, the attempt by the Berlusconi government to impose unilaterally and 
without the consent of trade unions a sweeping reform of labour law, constitutes a return to the 
conflictual character of labour policies.
3. Concluding remarks
T he argument put forward in this paper is that the welfare systems of Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain share all the basic institutional characteristics of the ‘state corporatist’ welfare 
model. However, the overall underdevelopment of the welfare state in the aforementioned 
countries, together with a number of similarities in their social structures and economic trajectories 
–especially familism– clearly classifies them in a distinctive sub-category of the above model. 
In other words, the southerners represent a distinct group, a variant within the family of the 
Continental welfare states. The four countries share some characteristics such as similar structures 
of social and economic development, the relative inefficiency of the social protection systems 
and some comparable social and family structures. Nevertheless, we have shown the existence of 
important differentiation inside the group: 
The dissimilar weight of patronage and clientelism, which is much stronger in Greece and 
Italy than in the Iberian countries, is one of the factors of this differentiation. The development 
of the female employment in Portugal is another. We have also noted a trend of convergence –at 
least with regard to the social expenditure levels– of the four countries and the rest of the EU. 
However, it is not at all certain that this trend will lead to full ‘Europeanisation’ of the social policy 
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of the four countries. Financial restraints on public spending imposed by the monetary union and 
the pressure of international competition in the globalised arena may be counter factors to that. 
As the industrial relations are undergoing a structural adjustment towards less protected patterns 
and as the traditional familism is gradually eroding, one cannot exclude a retrenchment in a weak 
welfare state in countries which have little, if anything, to put in its place.  For instance, the staff 
of the National Health System are allowed great margins of freedom to render services on a private 
basis and even the NHS itself contracts out to private health centers (the Spanish conciertos, the 
Italian centri convenzionati). Public institutions also display a low degree of state power proper, as 
they are highly vulnerable to partisan pressures and manipulations.
Notes
1. For instance, the staff of the National Health System are allowed great margins of freedom to 
render services on a private basis and even the NHS itself contracts out to private health cen-
ters (the Spanish conciertos, the Italian centri convenzionati). Public institutions also display 
a low degree of state power proper, as they are highly vulnerable to partisan pressures and 
manipulations..
2. For instance, according to the recent estimates of Bambra (Bambra, 2006) Italy belongs, to-
gether with core continental countries like Germany, in the same “medium decommodifying 
group”. Cf., however, also Scruggs and Allan, 2006.
3. It should be clear that public employment, as a welfare substitute, is quite different in the 
European South from the Scandinavian paradigm where the State is also an employer of first 
resort, as in the South, this does not serve any welfare state function but merely satisfies the 
clientelistic policies of the leading political parties.
4. Cf. the articles 1 para. 1 Constitution of Spain and 2 of the Constitution of Portugal.
5. Cf. the articles 2-4, 31, 32, 35-38, 41, 45, 46 of the Italian Constitution, 21, 22 of the Greek 
one, 39-52, 129, 148, 149 of the Spanish and 56, 59, 63-72, 108, 109, 167, 216 of the Por-
tuguese. 
6.   According to Crompton and Lyonette (2005, p.2), since the mid-1970s the number of women 
in workforce in Portugal has increased steadily, with well above 6o per cent of all women in 
work at the turn of the new millennium as opposed to only 18 per cent in the early 1960s. 
7.  The degree of labour flexibility and the deregulation of employment conditions and proce-
dures as well as the mix between rigidity and irregularity varies from one locality to another. 
This variability depends on a number of factors such as: sector of production prevailing in the 
area; size and type of firms; adjustments to changes in the labour market and to pressures ex-
erted by the EU convergence criteria; extent of state intervention and policy styles; and labour 
market reforms. 
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